

Supreme Court, U. S.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. _____, MISC.

76-803.

VESCO & CO., INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP.,

Respondent.

Motion for Leave to File Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari or Mandamus and Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari or Mandamus

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1976

No. , Misc.

VESCO & CO., INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP.,

Respondent.

**MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION
FOR COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI
OR MANDAMUS**

Petitioner respectfully moves this Court for leave to file the petition for issuance of a common law writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, hereto annexed, under Section 1651 of Title 28 of the United States Code, directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Honorable Robert P. Anderson, Honorable Walter R. Mansfield, and the Honorable William H. Mulligan, Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1976

VESCO & CO., INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP.,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Vesco & Co., Inc. respectfully prays that a common law writ of certiorari be granted or, alternatively, that a writ of mandamus be issued to review the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, entered in this cause on September 14, 1976.

OPINIONS BELOW

The orders of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, dated September 14, 1976, appear at (1a) of the appendix hereto. The decision and order of the Second Circuit dated May 13, 1976, appear at (3a) of the appendix hereto. The amended judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Judge Charles E. Stewart, Jr., presiding, dated May 26, 1976, also appears in the appendix, commencing at (16a).

JURISDICTION

The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sought to be reviewed was entered on September 14, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1651(a). The Second Circuit having declined to exercise jurisdiction upon petitioner's motion, the relief sought is not available in any other court and cannot be had through any other appellate processes.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. In denying petitioner's motion to reassume jurisdiction of issues undecided in a prior appeal, has the Court of Appeals treated petitioner unfairly, when the effect of such denial is to subject petitioner to massive judgments while simultaneously foreclosing it from contesting the merits of those judgments?

2. Are petitioner's due process rights vitiated by permitting execution against it on default judgments entered against an individual found to be its *alter ego*, where fundamental due process issues, crucial to the validity of the default judgments, remain unheard?

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

This is an action based upon alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78aa *et. seq.*) and Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is promulgated pursuant to the authorization contained in Section 10b of the 1934 Act [15 U.S.C. §78j(b)]. Jurisdiction is asserted by respondent based upon Section 27 of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. §78aa).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. *Basis for federal jurisdiction and the institution of the action*

Respondent, International Controls Corp. (hereinafter referred to as "ICC"), instituted this action on June 7, 1973. The complaint generally alleged that many of the named defendants, although not the petitioner, Vesco & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Company"), did by means of interstate commerce and the national securities exchanges, defraud respondent and its stockholders in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. §78aa). This alleged violation of the securities laws is the sole basis for federal jurisdiction in this case.

2. *Prior proceedings*

On June 7, 1973, ICC filed a complaint against many defendants alleging numerous violations of the federal securities law, as well as other common law wrongs (73 Civ. 2518). The allegations centered around two general series of events, to wit:

(1) certain transactions by those designated in the complaint as "Vesco and his group" and other alleged aiders and abettors regarding assets and funds of I.O.S. and other related companies; and

(2) certain other transactions by the same persons involving a Boeing 707 airplane.

Preliminary injunctive relief was secured by ICC, and the Company and other defendants filed motions challenging such relief, jurisdiction, and the sufficiency of the pleadings. See *ICC v. Vesco*, 490 F.2d 1334 (2 Cir. 1974). A petition for certiorari, filed by petitioner, was sub-

sequently denied by this Court. During the course of those proceedings, it was made clear that ICC would attempt to enforce against the Company any judgment it secured against Robert L. Vesco, and, at all stages, the Company sought to preserve its rights to be heard on the merits of any claims which ultimately would result in an attack on its assets.

On October 5, 1973, a default on the complaint was entered against Robert L. Vesco, individually (hereinafter referred to as "Vesco"), which was eventually followed by a partial inquest, setting partial damages at \$2,422,466.72. However, prior to the inquest, and prior to the entry of default, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding new causes of action (some of them against Vesco) and joining additional defendants. The inquest purported to determine damages based upon the complaint which no longer existed, having been superseded by the amended complaint. There has been no finding that the amended complaint has ever been served upon Vesco (although an affidavit of service *was* filed by ICC), and no default upon the amended complaint has ever been entered with respect to him.

On April 8, 1974, ICC filed a complaint against Robert L. Vesco in another action (74 Civ. 1588). Again, a default was entered against Vesco, and the Company (not a named party therein) sought to intervene to be heard on the issues of liability and damages. The trial court (also Judge Stewart) denied intervention, assuring counsel that the Company would have its opportunity to be heard if ICC sought to satisfy its judgment against Vesco out of assets of the Company. The Company's appeal to the Second Circuit of the denial of the intervention motion was denied, based, at least in part, upon the

trial court's assurance that the Company would have its opportunity to be heard.

3. *The District Court proceedings*

On May 20, 1975, ICC secured an order to show cause, in effect seeking to enforce both of its default judgments against Vesco by securing assets of the Company. The Company responded by seeking a hearing on the underlying claims against Vesco, both as to liability and damages, and otherwise challenging the appropriateness of executing upon the judgment at that time. The court, apparently reversing its prior stated position that the Company would have the opportunity to be heard on the merits of the judgment sought to be enforced, denied the Company's applications and ordered a hearing *only* on the issues of whether the Company was the *alter ego* of Vesco or whether fraudulent conveyances had been made.

The Company is a Delaware corporation formed on July 12, 1972, as a result of estate planning begun in late 1967 or early 1968, by counsel for the Vesco family along with its accountants. The ultimate creation of the Company was occasioned by tax rulings received on or about April 26, 1972 and July 21, 1972.

In the months of July through December of 1972, therefore, Vesco exchanged 800,000 shares of ICC common stock owned by him (having a value of \$2,500,000) to the Company in return for all of the preferred stock of the Company and a portion of the voting common stock. The preferred stock carried with it a liquidating preference equal to the same \$2,500,000.

In addition, 46,380 shares of ICC common stock beneficially owned by the Vesco children since 1966, were ex-

changed for a minority of the voting common stock and all of the nonvoting common stock of the Company.

One of the purposes and effect of the transfer was to put an upper limit on the value of Vesco's ICC holdings, for estate tax purposes, at the par value of the preferred stock (*i.e.* the appraised fair market value of that stock at the date of the exchanges), thereby permitting all future appreciation of that stock to inure to the benefit of the nonvoting common shareholders—the Vesco children—and to pass to them free of any estate tax.

Assets of the Company consist almost entirely of ICC stock. The Company's stock, in turn, is presently owned as follows: The preferred stock is held by Vesco; 75% of the common stock—the only voting stock—is owned by Patricia J. Vesco as custodian for Anthony, Dawn, and Robert, three of her children under the age of twenty-one. The balance is owned by Daniel Vesco who has passed the age of 21.

The *alter ego* hearing was held on June 20, 1975. By memorandum decision dated August 22, 1975, the Court held that the Company was the *alter ego* of Robert L. Vesco and, therefore, that the assets of the Company were available to satisfy the judgments against Vesco as an individual. The court thus never reached the alleged issue as to whether fraudulent conveyances had been effected. Orders were entered which had the effect of securing shares of stock now owned by the Company *without regard* to their prior ownership. Thus, stock beneficially owned by non-party third persons since approximately 1966, has been appropriated to satisfy the judgment against Vesco, although no one has even alleged, much less proved, any impropriety by anyone dating back anywhere near said period.

The Company duly filed and perfected an appeal to the Second Circuit. The Company argued on appeal that the court below had inconsistently granted plaintiff substantial rights to proceed as against the Company, while simultaneously denying the Company the right to be heard thereon. In short, in the view of the trial court, this defendant is *not* Vesco for purposes of appealing the lack of procedural and substantive due process, from service through judgment, and has *not* ever been permitted to be heard on the merits; however, it *is* Vesco for purposes of execution and collection.

Defendant's appeal, filed on September 19, 1975, resulted in a decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, dated May 13, 1976, by which the default judgment entered against Vesco, which formed the basis of the proceedings against the Company, was determined to lack the requisite elements of "finality." The Court of Appeals, thus, found it unnecessary to pass upon the remaining substantial issues, and remanded the matter to the District Court for clarification and the entry of a "new judgment." Although merely remanding for further proceedings on this underlying issue of the finality of the default judgment, the Court of Appeals did not expressly retain jurisdiction of the further consequential matters in dispute.

On May 21, 1976, ICC obtained an order to show cause from the District Court as to why a new amended judgment should not be entered *nunc pro tunc* as of July 12, 1974. On the return date of the order to show cause, May 26, 1976, the Company appeared to argue in vain its opposition to the entry of such a *nunc pro tunc* judgment. The court heard only brief argument and gave no substantial reasons for the extraordinary retrospective nature of the judgment entered. Thus, a new "final judgment"

was entered against Robert L. Vesco, purportedly effective as of almost two years earlier.

4. *The orders of the Court of Appeals*

Considerable confusion followed signing of the new amended judgment on May 26, 1976. On June 16, 1976, the Company's counsel received a copy of a letter from the attorneys for the plaintiff, addressed to the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, requesting guidance as to the status of the Company's original appeal. Counsel inquired:

"Please advise whether the Court of Appeals is now in a position to proceed to determine the issues on the appeal or whether any further action is required to complete the record."

Upon receipt of this letter, the Company's attorneys also wrote to the Clerk expressing their own uncertainty "as to the appropriate procedure for bringing before the Court the still unresolved issues." The Company's counsel suggested that the court set a reasonable timetable for amendment and completion of the record and for submission of supplemental memoranda of law with respect to Judge Stewart's "recent action."

The Company first learned that the amended judgment had been entered,* when it received the Clerk's response on June 24, 1976, advising that the earlier appeal was no longer before the appellate court, and that:

"[s]hould any further proceedings in the . . . litigation come before the court, the parties may, if so

* Although the court docket apparently contains a notation that notice was sent of the filing of the amended judgment, petitioner's counsel did not receive a copy of the same. They may not even have been mailed a copy because the judgment was *not* against petitioner, although it was clearly an interested, and appearing, party.

advised request the court to consider the matter on the briefs and appendix previously filed in that appeal, with whatever supplemental briefs they may desire to submit."

The last sentence pointed out that "the court cannot, of course, give any advisory opinion on the effect of the District Court's judgment entered May 27, 1976, ordered entered *nunc pro tunc* as of July 12, 1974."

Thus, learning in late June that the amended judgment had been docketed, and being in a quandry (as were the attorneys for plaintiff) as to the proper avenue for further proceedings, counsel for appellant herein filed its notice of appeal on July 7, 1976.

On August 4, 1976, almost a full month later, the Company was served with ICC's notice of motion to dismiss on the ground that the "Notice of Appeal was not timely filed and that no order has been entered extending the time for the filing of said Notice of Appeal."

The Company, on August 31, 1976, filed a notice of cross-motion for reacceptance of jurisdiction of the issues presented before the Second Circuit on the earlier appeal (25a). By orders dated September 14, 1976 (1a), the Second Circuit granted ICC's motion to dismiss, and denied petitioner's cross-motion for reacceptance of jurisdiction. Petitioner seeks review only from the order of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioner's cross-motion for reacceptance of jurisdiction of those issues properly presented, but undecided, on the earlier appeal, as affected by subsequent events.

REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW

I. Interests of fairness require that the Court of Appeals reassume jurisdiction over issues left undecided on the earlier appeal.

The Second Circuit upon the original appeal did not decide all of the issues presented, and did not expressly reserve jurisdiction over same, but remanded the matter to the District Court for further proceedings on the threshold issue of whether the judgment sought to be enforced was final. By denying petitioner's motion to reaccept jurisdiction, after its untimely appeal was rejected, the Court of Appeals, in essence, summarily affirmed the new amended judgment against the Company, based upon prior judgments by default entered against Vesco, without permitting the Company the opportunity to challenge the procedural or substantive propriety of the underlying judgments or of the decision imposing derivative liability on it for judgments entered against a different party. In effect, then, the Company has been subjected to massive judgments while simultaneously being foreclosed from contesting the merits of those judgments.

Indeed, from the outset, the Company, despite numerous motions, comprehensive briefs and repeated protestations of the infringement of its rights, has been denied the opportunity to litigate the merits of the underlying claims. The Company sought so to protect itself and its rights because it was openly and often stated in court that ICC would attempt to satisfy claims against Vesco by levying upon the assets of the Company.

In the District Court, upon partial inquest, counsel for the Company requested a hearing on the merits, and was rebuffed with this promise:

"THE COURT: I think there may be reasons to believe that you ought to have that full hearing. I would like to proceed this morning and I don't intend to require you to take positions today that you have not thought out and that you are not prepared to take because you have not developed a record.

"It seems to me we ought to proceed this morning and certainly I will give you full opportunity to be heard.

"I don't mean to suggest—I do mean to suggest, but I don't mean to reach any conclusion that by permitting you to participate at this state that I have made up my mind in any respect as to the ultimate question of whether or not your client can be subjected to liability."

On July 12, 1974, as the partial inquest continued, the following dialogue took place between Mr. Laurence B. Orloff, Esq., representing the Company, and the Court:

"MR. ORLOFF: Your Honor, I should have an opportunity to put some evidence before the Court also, and I would most respectfully say that I should have the opportunity to put forth evidence, not only as to the dollar figure of any damage award, but also as to the liability issue.

"I realize that the plaintiff has taken a contrary position in its memorandum, but, as we suggested to your Honor in our memorandum, both from the standpoint of Vesco & Co.'s potential vulnerability for any judgment against Robert Vesco, and by virtue of the fact that there has been a conspiracy alleged among a number of defendants, who have not had a chance to defend themselves as yet, on this issue, no judgment should be entered until that defense is put in.

"THE COURT: I have these thoughts about it:

It seems to me that in terms of the dollars, Mr. Carroll has told us what they are, and my notion is that this is reasonably clear.

"On the other hand, what you say about the merits concerns me. I think I am obligated to give you a hearing on the question of conspiracy and on the merits. I'd like to do it promptly. What's your notion on it?"

"MR. ORLOFF: Within some reasonable time period, your Honor. I don't mean months, but I am talking certainly about several weeks. I would be ready on that." (30a)

And later at that same hearing:

"MR. ORLOFF: I was going to ask of Mr. Carroll through the Court whether I am therefore assured, and I guess I must respectfully ask the Court, too, that if a judgment were to be entered against Robert L. Vesco alone, would Vesco & Co. have an opportunity at a later date to be heard fully on the merits?"

"THE COURT: I have just been told by Mr. Carroll he doesn't want a judgment against Vesco & Co., Inc.

"MR. ORLOFF: I think he is going to come in for one later on, and I want to make sure I will get my full hearing.

"THE COURT: Of course you will." (39a)

In another case entitled *ICC v. Vesco* (74 Civ. 1588), the Company was denied intervention and judgment by default was taken against Vesco in the amount of \$2,900,000. It is this judgment as well which plaintiff and the court below here intend to effectuate, by collection of the Company's assets.

In a hearing on that case held October 2, 1974, on the Company's motion to intervene, the following colloquy took place between counsel for the Company and Judge Stewart:

"THE COURT: So that it seems to me the question you are raising is in all respects premature.

"MR. ORLOFF: If my client, Vesco & Co., has the right to challenge the existence of the cause of action at some point in time, if that is what your Honor means by premature, then I can see an [sic] accept your Honor's point. At the moment there is nobody raising that point. There is nobody pointing out to the court that there is no claim here really of corporate opportunity.

"THE COURT: *Of course, the question will be presented to you if and when somebody comes after your client to try to get some of your assets, and then you will have full opportunity to litigate everything.*" (emphasis added) (42a).

A few moments later, the court made the following pronouncement:

"THE COURT: . . . I would suppose it is possible that there might be a way to raise a claim that no cause of action was stated and that therefore you can't come after me. I don't think we have to worry about that at this point.

It seems to me that the situation we are in today, Mr. Orloff and Mr. Camhy, is this: I am fully aware of the problems which are involved in this matter. I know who Vesco is. I know what Vesco & Co. is.

Of course, you are not going to take the position that you are Vesco, which you aren't.

And, of course, if Mr. Camhy reaches the point where he thinks he can go after Vesco & Co., Inc. to satisfy a judgment against Vesco, you are going to have the fullest opportunity to make whatever presentation you want."

Despite these repeated assurances from the District Court that the Company would have full and due opportunity to contest the merits of the underlying claims and related due process issues, the court abruptly foreclosed

the Company's rights and refused to consider any proofs on the legal propriety of the judgments now sought to be pressed against the Company.

No longer is the Company's assertion of its right to be heard on the merits "premature." Indeed, the propitious moment has come and gone unheralded.

Memoranda submitted both before and after such "partial inquest" dealt squarely with the issue of the Company's right to be heard on these issues. In the Company's prehearing memorandum in the case *sub judice*, for instance, it argued that because of the unique nature of ICC's allegations that the Company is merely the *alter ego* of Vesco, it should be entitled to contest any aspect of the liability asserted against him.

In light of the manifestly cursory and summary considerations given by the District Court to this matter on remand and, further, in consideration of the paramount significance of these remaining issues to the petitioner, it is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeals should have reassumed and accepted jurisdiction of these earlier issues. Refusal to do so denies to petitioner and all parties concerned full and final appellate review, and is manifestly unfair and unjust.

It is submitted that this is one of those rare cases where the "interests of justice" require intervention by this Court despite expiration of the time to appeal. *cf. Gondeck v. Pan Am World Airways*, 382 U.S. 25, 86 S. Ct. 153, 15 L.Ed. 2d 21, (1965); *United States v. Ohio Power Co.*, 353 U.S. 98, 77 S. Ct. 652, 1 L.Ed. 2d 683 (1957).

The instant situation is substantially similar to *Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.*, 351 U.S. 183, 76 S. Ct. 758, 100 L.Ed. 1075 (1956), where interests of fairness compelled this Court to recall a District Court judgment, so

as to remand the cause to the Court of Appeals for determination of a question left undecided on a prior appeal.

There, from a judgment of the District Court in favor of the plaintiff in an action under the Federal Employees' Liability Act, the defendant railroad appealed to the Court of Appeals on two grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence to permit the submission of the case to the jury; (2) the trial judge erroneously admitted evidence of prior accidents at the scene of plaintiff's injury. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed by the United States Supreme Court and the railroad's petition for a rehearing was denied. After a certified copy of the judgment was sent to the District Court, that court denied an application for a stay of execution, and the judgment was satisfied, but plaintiff was informed that defendant intended to pursue its remedies notwithstanding payment of the judgment. The defendant then filed in the Supreme Court a motion to recall and amend the judgment, so as to remand the cause to the Court of Appeals for a determination of the question left undecided on the original appeal, to wit, whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior accidents.

The defendant's motion to recall was granted, in view of the fact that the original order of the Supreme Court was erroneous and the recall was in the interest of fairness. Moreover, Supreme Court Rule 58(4), which bars consecutive and out-of time petitions for rehearing, was held not to prohibit the motion, to correct the error there involved.

See also: *Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.*, 350 U.S. 811, 76 S.Ct. 38, 100 L.Ed. 727 (1954).

The situation here presented parallels that in *Cahill* and, petitioner submits, presents equities even more com-

elling to the conclusion that jurisdiction over undecided issues should have been reaccepted. By refusing to so act, the Court of Appeals has, in essence, affirmed the District Court's actions whereby plaintiff has been granted substantial rights to proceed as against the Company, while simultaneously denying the Company the right to be heard thereon. In short, in the view of the trial court, and with the indirect imprimatur of the Court of Appeals, this defendant is *not* Vesco for purposes of appealing the lack of procedural and substantive due process, from service through judgment, and has *not* ever been permitted to be heard on the merits; however, it is Vesco for purposes of execution and collection. The actions of the courts below were manifestly unfair and unjust, and it is now left to this Court to exercise its power of supervision to remedy those wrongs.

It should be noted that, in effect, the procedural confusion was created by the Court of Appeals. The Company filed a timely appeal from the only judgment affecting it—to wit, that it was the *alter ego* of Robert Vesco. Rather than deciding the issues raised by the Company, the court remanded for resolution of issues concerning the judgment against Robert Vesco, not the Company. The new amended judgment was not a judgment or order directly affecting the Company. It had uncertain standing to appeal from that judgment. The Second Circuit in the first instance should have retained jurisdiction, or at least reaccepted jurisdiction when the Company so moved. It should be noted that no party could demonstrate any prejudice in view of the time span involved; the Company's briefs had been filed as of the time of the September 14, 1976 decision of the Court of Appeals and the entire controversy could have been decided on the merits in a matter of weeks. Nonetheless, the Company's efforts

to secure appellate review were rebuffed, without recourse except to this Court.

II. The issues raised, but undetermined, in the prior appeal are substantial and draw into question elemental issues of justice, which should have been retained by the Court of Appeals in the first instance or reaccepted upon later application.

From the outset, the Company has vigorously contended that the parties to be charged with staggering judgments have been treated in a manner inconsistent with all notions of fundamental due process. The issues raised on perfected prior appeal, but left unreviewed and undecided on the merits by *any* appellate court, may be roughly summarized, as follows:

1. *Form of Judgment*

The default judgment as entered below, and indeed the amended judgment entered on May 27, 1976, are unclear, confusing and uncertain on their face. The judgments in question purport to dispose of one count of the complaint and "so much of" six other counts as relate to various categories of transactions. It is, frankly, impossible to determine what matters and portions of the pleadings have been disposed of and what remains for further proceedings. Moreover, it cannot be determined from the face of the original judgment (or, for that matter, from the amended judgment) whether the matters determined are those of the original complaint or of the amended complaint. As to the amended complaint, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of purported service, but there has been no determination as to whether that service was effective or valid. The entry of an amended judgment in May of 1976 in no way cleared up this confusion, leaving con-

tinuing uncertainty as to whether "finality" exists for purposes of execution and further proceedings. See *United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich.*, 401 U.S. 576, 91 S. Ct. 1076, 28 L.Ed. 339 (1971).

Similarly, the judgments, both original and as amended, purport to be "final," although they do not dispose of all of the issues between the parties, all of the issues as to the defendant Vesco, or even all of the issues in some counts of the complaint. Under these circumstances, it is hard to imagine how such a judgment could be final or provide a basis for further collection proceedings. See, *United States v. Burnett*, 262 F.2d 55 (9 Cir. 1959).

2. *Complaint v. Amended Complaint*

The default judgment here at issue is purportedly based upon a complaint filed in June of 1973, and allegedly served upon Robert L. Vesco on July 30, 1973. On September 7, 1973, respondent ICC served a complete amended complaint adding new parties and claims. On October 1, 1973, respondent ICC moved for entry of default on the original complaint which had already been superseded by an amended pleading. On October 5, 1973, "judgment by default" was entered on the original complaint as against Robert L. Vesco and all further proceedings have purportedly been on the basis of the original complaint. There has been no finding at any time that the amended complaint was properly served on Robert L. Vesco. Counsel for the Company have attempted to argue that, upon the filing of an amended pleading complete in itself, the original complaint is completely superseded and all further proceedings must be based on the amended pleadings. *Washer v. Bullitt County*, 110 U.S. 558, 4 S.Ct. 249, 28 L.Ed. 249, 250 (1884); *Lubin v.*

Chicago Title and Trust Company, 260 F.2d 411, 413 (7 Cir. 1958); *Bullen v. DeBretteville*, 239 F.2d 824, 833 (9 Cir. 1956), *cert. den. sub nom. Treasure Co. v. Bullen*, 353 U.S. 947, 77 S.Ct. 825, 1 L.Ed.2d 856 (1957); *Phillips v. Murchison*, 194 F. Supp. 620, 621-622 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); *Hutchins v. Priddy*, 103 F. Supp. 601, 606-607 (W.D. Mo. 1952); 3 *Moore's Federal Practice*, ¶ 15.08[7], p. 939 (2d ed. 1974).

For these reasons, it would appear that the default judgment, based upon an abandoned complaint, is facially void and ineffective.

3. *The right of Vesco & Co., Inc. to be heard on the merits of the claims*

Nearly from the outset, respondent ICC has made it clear that it intended to seek satisfaction of any judgment it obtained as against Robert L. Vesco out of the assets of the Company, although it is not, and never has been alleged that the Company played any role in the alleged wrongful conduct as set forth in the complaint and amended complaint. Throughout, the Company has taken the position that it should, at some point, be entitled to be heard on the merits of the underlying claims and on the propriety of the procedural and substantive determinations which, in the final analysis, were to be charged against the defendant company. At every turn, this opportunity was foreclosed, leading ultimately to the anomalous situation of the Company being subject to execution on judgments totalling in excess of \$5,000,000 without ever once having the chance to argue the merits of the underlying controversies. Moreover, other pleadings filed in this case demonstrating that some of the exact claims covered by ICC's judgment were settled with other defendants, but the amount received was not credited to

the Company. This rough justice is improper and legally erroneous. See *Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines*, 409 U.S. 363, 93 S. Ct. 647, 34 L.Ed. 2d 577 (1973) *reh. den.* 410 U.S. 975, 93 S. Ct. 1434, 35 L.Ed. 2d 707 (1973); *United States v. Borchardt*, 470 F.2d 257 (7 Cir. 1972); *cf. Modern Brokerage Corp. v. Massachusetts Bond & Insurance Co.*, 54 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).

4. Finality

Although the District Court ultimately determined, on remand, that it had intended to enter, and did enter, a final judgment by default as against Robert L. Vesco, there survives a continuing question as to propriety of the entry of a final judgment against but one alleged co-conspirator in a matter involving stated joint action and alleged joint liability. This situation is particularly exacerbated by the fact that the "final" judgments, both original and amended, deal with but broad categories of claims and do not even finally delimit those counts of the pleadings which are the subject of judgment. In these circumstances, the entry of a final judgment, the basis for execution proceedings as against the Company, is wholly improper. *Frow v. De La Vega*, 82 U.S. 552, 554, 21 L.Ed. 60 (1872); *United States v. Peerless Insurance Company*, 374 F.2d 942 (4 Cir. 1967); 6 *Moore's Federal Practice*, ¶ 54.52 and ¶ 54.43[5]. *Exquisite Form Industries, Inc. v. Exquisite Fabrics of London*, 19 F.R. Serv. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

5. Alter Ego—The evidence and the result

On very skimpy evidence, the District Court concluded, after a brief hearing, that the Company was the *alter ego* of Robert L. Vesco and, therefore, that its assets were available in satisfaction of creditors' claims against Vesco. Without recounting the evidence herein in detail,

it is sufficient to say that the court below invoked this extraordinary doctrine on the basis of insufficient evidence at odds with applicable decisional law.

Equally importantly, the District Court, in effect, ordered a forfeiture of *all* assets of the Company, despite the fact that other persons have substantial beneficial interests in the Company. These persons were never made party to this proceeding and, thus, even if ICC were to be permitted to pursue assets of the Company transferred by Robert L. Vesco, there exists no basis of *any kind* upon which the assets of other persons could be similarly forfeited. This flagrant abuse of justice, to the detriment of non-party third persons, remains unremedied and constitutes perhaps the most palpably unjust result of the proceedings below.

6. The Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc*

The propriety of the new amended judgment, and particularly its entrance *nunc pro tunc* as of July 12, 1974, has never been, but should be, considered by an appellate court. The entrance of such a *nunc pro tunc* judgment was clearly erroneous. Excluding situations in which a litigant dies subsequent to the commencement of an action, but prior to its conclusion, judgment will be entered *nunc pro tunc*—i.e., given retroactive effect back to a date certain—only when the judgment was not entered on that date due to the failure of the clerk to properly perform his ministerial function of entering judgment due to error, unwarranted delay, or *other reasons unrelated to the legal*

* This issue resulted from proceedings immediately following the remand by the Second Circuit and was, therefore, not part of the perfected first appeal. The confusion ensuing from the apparently complete remand caused this fundamental issue also to be foreclosed from appellate review. However, its import and implication serves as a stark object lesson of roughshod justice accorded to the Company, and indeed any other person ICC conclusionarily thrusts under the "Vesco" umbrella.

issues of the case. 6A Moore's Federal Practice ¶58.08 (1974); *Recile v. Ward*, 496 F.2d 675 (5 Cir. 1974), *mod.*, *rehearing den.*, 503 F.2d 1374 (5 Cir. 1974); *Cairns v. Richardson*, 457 F.2d 1145 (10 Cir. 1972).

Absolutely no showing was made or attempted by ICC to the effect that the new judgment was occasioned by clerical error or for non-legal reasons. Indeed, none could be made because the new judgment contains two new substantive provisions: (1) ICC deleted its prior reservation to prove additional damages on some claims, and (2) ICC included a rule 54(b) certification of no just reason for delay although nothing was presented to the court in connection therewith. All prior judgments were submitted by ICC and the changes made were for legal, substantive reasons making the use of *nunc pro tunc* patently erroneous.

Moreover, the relationship back at best should have been to July 16, 1974 (the date of entry of the prior judgment), not July 12, 1974 (the date the prior judgment was signed). Although called to the trial court's attention, it declined to make even this clearly required change, demonstrating its indifferent attitude to the plight of petitioner.

• • •

The above issues, most properly before the Second Circuit in the first instance, have never been reviewed or ruled upon by the Court of Appeals. After preliminarily determining that certain obvious deficiencies appeared from the face of the original default judgment, the Second Circuit remanded the matter to the District Court for clarification on the issue of finality. For this reason, the remaining issues were not at that time considered or disposed of. However, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals was apparently merely remanding the cause for

"clarification," there was no express retention of jurisdiction.

The District Court proceedings, in summary fashion, "clarified" the status and entered a new final judgment, *nunc pro tunc* to a date almost two years earlier, within two weeks of the decision by the Second Circuit.

It was unclear, both to counsel for the Company and to counsel for ICC, whether the matter would proceed directly to the Second Circuit without the necessity of further filings, which appeared to be the most logical and expeditious course under the circumstances. However, the absence of an express retention of jurisdiction apparently foreclosed this step and the matter proceeded in the direction of an aborted second appeal on the same issues. Even though the *mutual* confusion stemmed from the misunderstood fact of complete remand, the Court of Appeals refused upon due motion to reassume jurisdiction. As a consequence, and because of the late filing of the second appeal, which merely renewed the substantive items of the first appeal, the Company has been denied appellate review of *any* of the aforesaid substantial issues. Perhaps this treatment is consistent with the sad and shocking manner that the Company has been treated throughout by the trial court, but it certainly is not consistent with any notions of substantial justice and fair access to the courts as long recognized by this Court. It is respectfully submitted that this Court should, for these reasons, finally give the Company its due "day in court" whatever the ultimate result. To rule otherwise, would be to countenance the most flagrant abandonment of equal treatment imaginable.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully submits that this case presents the overriding issue of whether litigants will be treated fairly before the courts, and will be granted their full day in court before being subjected to the forfeiture of their assets by reason of judgments entered against another person.

For all of the foregoing reasons, a common law certiorari should be granted or, alternatively, a writ of mandamus should issue to review the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

/s/ Albert G. Besser
ALBERT G. BESSER
A Member of the Firm

HANNOCH, WEISMAN,
STERN & BESSER,
Attorneys for Petitioner

744 Broad Street,
Newark, New Jersey 07102

APPENDIX

ORDERS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 1976

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court House, in the City of New York, on the fourteenth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.

It is hereby ordered that the motion made herein by counsel for the appellee by notice of motion dated August 4, 1976 to dismiss the appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for lack of jurisdiction be and it hereby is granted.

A. DANIEL FUSARO,
Clerk

By: Edward J. Guardaro
Senior Deputy Clerk

Before: Hon. Robert P. Anderson
Hon. Walter R. Mansfield
Hon. William H. Mulligan
Circuit Judges

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court House, in the City of New York, on the fourteenth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.

It is hereby ordered that the motion made herein by counsel for the Vesco & Co., appellant, by notice of cross-motion dated August 30, 1976 for reconsideration of the issues raised in an earlier appeal (Docket No. 75-7548) be and it hereby is denied.

A. DANIEL FUSARO,
Clerk

By: Edward J. Guardaro,
Senior Deputy Clerk

Before: Hon. Robert P. Anderson
Hon. Walter R. Mansfield
Hon. William H. Mulligan
Circuit Judges

ORDER AND OPINION OF SECOND CIRCUIT FILED MAY 13, 1976

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court-house in the City of New York, on the thirteenth day of May, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.

Present: Hon. Irving R. Kaufman
Chief Judge

Hon. J. Joseph Smith
Hon. Robert P. Anderson
Circuit Judges

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the action of said District Court be and it hereby is remanded to said District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of this court.

A. DANIEL FUSARO,
Clerk

By: Vincent A. Carlin
Chief Deputy Clerk

Before: KAUFMAN, *Chief Judge*, SMITH and ANDERSON, *Circuit Judges*.

Appeal from order permitting execution against corporate assets on default judgment against individual. Remanded for clarification of judgment and determination of specific claims on which money judgment entered.

JAMES J. SHRAGER, Newark, N.J. (Hannoch, Weisman, Stern & Besser, Newark, N.J., Susan I. Littman, on the brief), and Arum, Friedman & Katz, New York, N.Y., *for Appellant*.

MILTON S. GOULD, New York, N.Y. (Shea, Gould, Climenko, Kramer & Casey, New York, N.Y., Daniel L. Carroll, of Counsel), *for Appellee*.

SMITH, *Circuit Judge*:

Vesco & Co., Inc. (hereinafter the Company) is a personal holding company owned and controlled by financier Robert L. Vesco (hereinafter Vesco) and his family. The Company appeals from a decision rendered against it on August 22, 1975, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Charles E. Stewart, Jr., *Judge*). That decision permits plaintiff-appellee International Controls Corp. (hereinafter ICC) to pierce the Company's corporate veil and use the Company's corporate assets to satisfy a judgment entered against Vesco personally.

For the reasons outlined below, we remand this controversy to the district court for further proceedings.

I. Background

The instant appeal stems from the continuing efforts of ICC to recover damages against Vesco, his associates and various corporations controlled by the Vesco interests. Since the earlier stages of this saga have been examined elsewhere, *International Controls Corp. v. Vesco*, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974), it is necessary for us to describe here only the most recent events in this extended litigation.

On June 7, 1973, the Special Counsel for ICC filed an action charging Vesco, Vesco's associates and many of the companies controlled by Vesco with having violated §10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission and a variety of common law fiduciary duties. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. The heart of ICC's complaint against Vesco and his co-defendants is their alleged waste and misuse of ICC's corporate assets to the detriment of ICC's other shareholders.

On October 5, 1973, a default judgment was entered against Vesco, as a result of Vesco's failure to appear in the Southern District of New York along with the other defendants. The judgment of October 5, 1973, while establishing Vesco's personal liability, did not fix the amount of damages.

Following several hearings on the question of damages, a second default judgment was entered against Vesco on July 12, 1974. This latter judgment specified damages of \$2,422,466.72, but left open the possibility that ICC might be able to prove further damages in subsequent proceedings.

Thus armed with two default judgments against Vesco, ICC attempted to satisfy its judgments with the corporate assets of the Company. ICC argued that the facts of the

case warranted the piercing of the Company's corporate veil and the use of the assets of the Company to satisfy the judgments entered against Vesco personally. On August 22, 1975, Judge Stewart accepted ICC's arguments and issued an order authorizing ICC to satisfy its default judgments against Vesco with the assets of the Company.

It is from the order of August 22, 1975, that the Company appeals.

The Company advances four arguments for the reversal of Judge Stewart's order of August 22, 1975. First, the Company asserts that it was improper for the district court to pierce the Company's corporate veil and allow ICC to use the Company's assets to satisfy personal judgments against Vesco.

Second, the Company argues that the two default judgments which the execution order of August 22, 1975, is intended to satisfy were entered improperly since the Company was denied the right to present Vesco's personal defenses before the entry of the default judgments. Had Vesco been present to defend himself, the Company asserts, he would have raised two issues, alleged defects in the service upon him and alleged defects in ICC's pleadings below. Had these defenses been entertained by the court, the Company continues, they would have prevented the entry of default judgments against Vesco and thereby would have eliminated the basis for the subsequent execution order against the Company. It was thus a mistake, the Company concludes, for Judge Stewart to forbid the Company to raise those personal defenses on Vesco's behalf.

The Company argues, third, that certain assets which it holds are owned beneficially by Vesco's children and that those assets should be removed from the scope of the August 22, 1975, execution order. Finally, the Company

asserts that the two default judgments entered against Vesco were not final and that, therefore, they cannot provide the basis for the subsequent execution order issued against the Company on August 22, 1975.

Since it is unclear from the record below whether, in fact, the default judgments against Vesco were final and therefore subject to execution, we remand for further proceedings.

II. The Issue of Finality

It is well-established that "execution ordinarily may issue only upon a final judgment." *Redding & Co. v. Russwine Construction Corp.*, 417 F.2d 721, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 3 C.J.S. *Executions* §6c.

The order issued by Judge Stewart on August 22, 1975, was the first step in ICC's efforts to secure execution of the two default judgments entered earlier against Vesco. Hence, the validity of the August 22, 1975, execution order against the Company depends upon the finality of the earlier default judgments which that execution order is intended to satisfy. Only if the underlying judgments against Vesco are final is the subsequent execution order against the Company valid.

The Company argues that the default judgments entered against Vesco were not final. The Company points out that the first judgment entered against Vesco on October 5, 1973, did not specify the damages owed by Vesco to ICC. The failure to so specify, the Company claims, makes the first judgment interlocutory, rather than final, in nature.¹

1. The judgment of October 5, 1973, reads as follows:

JUDGMENT

This action having been commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of a summons on the 7th day of June, 1973, and this court by order dated July 27, 1973, having authorized Lois Saylor Yohann to effect service

With respect to the second judgment entered on July 12, 1974, the Company points out that the judgment affords

of process herein on defendant Robert L. Vesco, and a copy of the said summons and complaint having been duly served on defendant Robert L. Vesco by Lois Sylor Yohonn on the 30th day of July, 1973, and proof of such service having been filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court on the 6th day of August, 1973; and

Defendant, ROBERT L. VESCO, having failed to plead, appear, move or otherwise defend with respect to the complaint herein, and the time for said defendant to appear answer or otherwise move having expired, and said defendant's default having been noted and entered;

AND, it appearing to the court that there is no just reason for delay in entering the within judgment against defendant Robert L. Vesco;

NOW, on motion of Shea Gould Climenko & Kramer attorneys for the plaintiff, and, upon the affidavit of Sheldon D. Camby, sworn to the 2nd day of October, 1973 that defendant Robert L. Vesco is not an infant or incompetent person and is not in the military service of the United States; it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff have judgment against the defendant Robert L. Vesco as demanded in the complaint herein; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant Robert L. Vesco be, and he hereby is, permanently enjoined from using the assets of plaintiff or its subsidiaries or the proceeds thereof for his own purpose to the loss and detriment of International Controls Corp. and its shareholders; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant Robert L. Vesco account to plaintiff for all profits or gains received by him or those acting in concert with or aiding and abetting him in the transactions set forth in the complaint herein or in transaction thereafter entered complaint herein or in transaction thereafter entered into by him with funds or property wrongfully held by him by reason of the wrongful acts set forth in the complaint and all injury sustained by plaintiff by reason of the acts alleged in the complaint; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Robert L. Vesco be and he hereby is required to indemnify plaintiff for all liability to others which it has or may incur by reason of the acts alleged in the complaint; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant Robert L. Vesco be and he hereby is, liable to plaintiff for all loss, damage, cost and expense arising from the acts alleged in the complaint herein and that the amount of said loss, damage, cost and expense be determined by the Court upon a hearing; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the aforesaid hearing as to plaintiff's loss, damage cost and expense be set down and held on a day designated by plaintiff, upon the plaintiff giving defendant Robert L. Vesco ten days notice of said hearing by registered or certified mail at Brace Ridge Road, Nassau, The Bahamas and 170 Denville Road, Boonton Township, New Jersey 07005; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that upon the holding of the aforesaid hearing as to plaintiff's damages and the determination of said damages, the within judgment be amended granting plaintiff judgment against defendant Robert L. Vesco for the amount of such loss, damage, cost and ex-

ICC the opportunity to prove additional damages in subsequent proceedings.² In addition, the Company points out that the judgment of July 12, 1974, does not contain the certification of finality required by Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in cases, such as this, where judgment is entered against one defendant while the other co-defendants continue to contest liability in the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).³

pense together with interest and costs and disbursements of this action and that such amended judgment be entered against defendant Robert L. Vesco; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff shall have the right to apply at the foot of said judgment for such other and further relieve [sic] as to the Court may seem just and proper in the circumstances.

/s/ Charles E. Stewart, Jr.
U.S.D.J.

2. The judgment of July 12, 1974, reads as follows:

A judgment having been entered herein against Robert L. Vesco on October 5, 1973;

AND this cause having been brought on for partial inquest before the Court on May 14 and 22, 1974 and July 12, 1974, after the required notice was given to defendant Robert L. Vesco, and plaintiff having offered proof establishing damages in the amount of \$2,188,354.93; it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff recover of defendant Robert L. Vesco the sum of \$2,188,354.93 plus interest on said sum at the rate of 6% from March 1, 1973, or a total of \$2,422,466.72 and that plaintiff have execution therefor; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff shall have the right to prove such additional loss, damage, cost and expense it has suffered by reason of the acts alleged in the complaint, the amount of such additional loss, damage, cost and expense to be determined by the Court upon an additional hearing or hearings to be held as provided for in said October 5, 1973 judgment.

Dated: New York, New York /s/ Charles E. Stewart, Jr.
July 12, 1974 U.S.D.J.

3. Rule 54(b) reads as follows:

(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

These two flaws in the second judgment, the Company maintains, make that judgment interlocutory also. Hence, the Company concludes, neither judgment against Vesco is final and thus the execution order issued against the Company on August 22, 1975, is invalid in the absence of an underlying final judgment.⁴

It is the position of ICC that the second judgment issued on July 12, 1974, is final and therefore provides a proper basis for the August 22, 1975, execution order issued against the Company.⁵ On the question of the Rule 54(b) certification, ICC points out that the first judgment did contain such a certification.⁶ Since the second judgment refers back to and is an extension of the first,⁷ ICC asserts, the Rule 54(b) certification of the first judgment must be imputed to the second.

Futhermore, ICC maintains that a judgment, such as the second judgment issued on July 22, 1975, is final as long as it specifies some amount of damages which the plaintiff can collect. Finality, ICC argues, does not require that a judgment specify all damages as long as it provides a minimal dollar figure which the plaintiff can collect while proving additional damages.

4. The Company also argues that, notwithstanding the terms of Rule 54(b), the decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Frow v. De La Vega*, 82 U.S. 552 (1872), still forbids the entry of a final judgment against one defendant while the others continue to contest liability in the district court. We think it is most unlikely that *Frow* retains any force subsequent to the adoption of Rule 54(b). In any event, at most, *Frow* controls in situations where the liability of one defendant necessarily depends upon the liability of the others. *Redding & Co. v. Russwine Construction Corp.*, 463 F.2d 929, 932-33 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Since Vesco's liability in the instant setting does not depend upon that of any of his co-defendants, Vesco cannot avail himself of whatever authority *Frow* might retain.

5. ICC makes no attempt on appeal to argue that the judgment of October 5, 1973, constitutes a final judgment. Since that judgment specifies no damages whatsoever, it, of course, cannot be considered final. *Western Geophysical Co. of America, Inc. v. Bolt Associates, Inc.*, 463 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972).

6. See note 1, *supra*, ¶3.

7. See note 2, *supra*, ¶¶1 and 4.

This court has repeatedly stressed the importance of strict adherence to the certification requirements of Rule 54(b). See, e.g., *Browning Debenture Holders Committee v. DASA Corp.*, 524 F.2d 811, 814 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975); Wright & Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil* §2660. The confusion surrounding the instant appeal demonstrates the need for such careful compliance.

We are frankly unsure whether the district court originally intended for the Rule 54(b) certification contained in its first judgment to apply to its second judgment as well. While that is one reasonable interpretation of the second judgment and while Judge Stewart indicated about one year after entry of the second judgment that this interpretation was the proper one, the very terms of Rule 54(b) require that certification of finality be "express" so as to avoid any ambiguity.

The failure to comply with the literal requirements of Rule 54(b) with respect to the second judgment might not, by itself, have compelled a remand to the district court although, as we noted in *Browning Debenture Holders Committee, supra*, we view strict compliance with Rule 54(b) as a matter of the greatest importance. However, other ambiguities in the judgment of July 12, 1974, compel us to return this case to the district court. In particular, the decision of the district court to allow for additional proof of damages prevents us from characterizing the second judgment of July 12, 1974, as final.

"A 'final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the courts to do but execute the judgment." *Catlin v. United States*, 24 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). The judgment of July 12, 1974, does not end this litigation with respect to Robert L. Vesco: ICC retains the right to appear and assert additional damages against him. Because the judgment leaves

ICC that option, it cannot be viewed as final since finality implies that, after the entry of judgment, the court will concern itself with nothing other than the mechanics of execution.

The circumstances here are quite similar to the facts in *United States v. Burnett*, 262 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1958, 1959). In *Burnett*, an airline passenger sued the United States for injuries sustained as a result of poor maintenance at a federally-owned airport. After finding for the plaintiff on the issue of liability and after deciding on part of the damage award to which the plaintiff was entitled, the district court entered a judgment declaring the government's liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act and fixing partial damages. However, the district court in *Burnett*, like the district court here, left open the possibility that the plaintiff might prove additional damages at a later date.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "the legal effect of what the [district] court did was to announce and enter an interlocutory decision." Because the provision allowing for proof of future damages "made it clear that the [district] court had not finally disposed of the law suit," the judgment could not be construed as final. *Burnett*, *supra* at 59.

Burnett was cited with approval by this court in *Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Giesow*, 412 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1969). While there were other grounds for our decision in *Giesow*, we indicated on the authority of *Burnett* that a judgment fixing certain damages but not others could not be considered final. *Giesow*, *supra* at 470.

In short, a judgment cannot be considered final as long as it leaves open the question of additional damages. The essence of a final judgment is that it leaves for the court nothing to do but order execution.

There is, however, one aspect of the situation here which distinguishes it from *Burnett* and *Giesow* and which leads us to remand, rather than reverse, the decision below. In both *Burnett* and *Giesow*, the plaintiffs advanced a single claim. Here, in contrast, ICC asserts multiple claims against Vesco alleging violations of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, violations of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, breach of fiduciary duties, waste of corporate assets, fraud, and corporate self-dealing.

In a situation, such as that on appeal, where liability is established on multiple claims, Rule 54(b) authorizes the district court to determine the damages stemming from some of the claims and to enter final judgments with respect to them, while retaining jurisdiction over the other claims in which damages have not yet been proven. Such a procedure is not required in multi-claim suits, but it is permitted if the district court makes the proper certification. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also Wright & Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil* §§2653, 2654.

Burnett and *Giesow* establish that, for a final judgment to be entered on any one claim, all damages stemming from that claim must be fixed. Rule 54(b) establishes that final judgments may, at the court's discretion, be entered for some claims while the court retains jurisdiction over the others. However, for a claim to be the subject of a final judgment and certification under Rule 54(b), the requirements of *Burnett* and *Giesow* must be met with respect to that particular claim. In other words, the district court may utilize its Rule 54(b) powers with respect to a given claim only if all damages stemming from that claim have been fixed.

It is unclear from the record below whether the district court applied these rules properly in this case. If the judgment of July 12, 1974, allows ICC to prove further

damages for each and every of its claims against Vesco, then no Rule 54(b) certification can be entered for any of the claims since such certification and final judgment are permissible with respect to any one claim only if all damages stemming from that claim have been fixed. However, if the judgment of July 12, 1974, is to be understood as establishing all damages for some of the claims and allowing future proof of damages for the remaining claims only, then Rule 54(b) certification is proper with respect to those claims for which all damages have been proven.

In short, the judgment of July 12, 1974, is susceptible to two interpretations, one which is consistent with Rule 54(b) certification, the other which is not. Accordingly, we remand for the entry of a new judgment to clarify for which, if any, of the claims against Vesco all damages have been computed. If the damage award of \$2,422,466.72 entered on July 12, 1974, was intended to include all the damages from any of the claims against Vesco, those specific claims for which no further damages may be proven may be the subject of a final judgment and Rule 54(b) certification. However, the claims on which ICC is still free to prove additional damages may not be subject to a final judgment or Rule 54(b) certification.

III. Summary

In summary, we remand to the district court for an apportionment among the various claims raised by ICC of the damages assessed by the district court on July 12, 1974. For those claims for which further damages may not be proven, the district court may enter a final judgment and, if it chooses, provide for explicit Rule 54(b) certification. However, the district court must retain jurisdiction over the remaining claims for which ICC may prove additional damages. No final judgment may be entered with respect to any of those claims until all damages have been assessed.

In light of our decision to remand for the reasons stated above, it is unnecessary for us to reach the other arguments raised by the Company on appeal.

Remanded.

**AMENDED JUDGMENT ENTERED
MAY 27, 1976**

A judgment having been entered herein against Robert L. Vesco on October 5, 1973;

AND, this cause having been brought on for partial inquest before the Court on May 14 and 22, 1974 and July 12, 1974, after the required notice was given to defendant Robert L. Vesco, and plaintiff having offered proof establishing damages in the amount of \$2,188,354.93 with respect to the claims set forth in Count Two of the Complaint;

AND, it appearing, and the undersigned having expressly determined, that there is no just reason for delay in entering a final judgment against defendant Robert L. Vesco with respect to the claims set forth in the Second Count of the Complaint and so much of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Counts as relate to claims arising out of (a) the dividend in kind of the outstanding shares of Fairfield General Corporation declared by International Controls Corp. in late 1970; (b) the purchase by Skyways Leasing Corporation of a Boeing 707 airplane in June of 1971 with funds contributed to Skyways Leasing Corporation by International Controls Corp.; (c) the lease between International Controls Corp. and Skyways Leasing Corporation relating to the Boeing 707 airplane and all payments made by International Controls Corp. thereunder and (d) all monies paid by International Controls Corp. in connection with defendant Robert L. Vesco's use of the Boeing 707 airplane; and the undersigned having hereby expressly directed the entry of final judgment with respect to said claims; it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff recover of defendant Robert L. Vesco the sum of \$2,188,354.93 plus interest on said sum at the rate of 6% from March 1, 1973 or a total through July 12, 1974 of \$2,422,466.72 with respect to the claims asserted in the Second

Count of the Complaint and so much of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Counts as relate to claims arising out of (a) the dividend in kind of the outstanding shares of Fairfield General Corporation declared by International Controls Corp. in late 1970; (b) the purchase by Skyways Leasing Corporation of a Boeing 707 airplane in June of 1971 with funds contributed to Skyways Leasing Corporation by International Controls Corp.; (c) the lease between International Controls Corp. and Skyways Leasing Corporation relating to the Boeing 707 airplane and all payments made by International Controls Corp. thereunder and (d) all monies paid by International Controls Corp. in connection with defendant Robert L. Vesco's use of the Boeing 707 airplane; and that the plaintiff have execution therefor; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff shall have a right to prove such additional loss, damage, cost and expense as it has suffered by reason of the claims alleged in the Complaint, other than those as to which judgment has been hereinabove granted, the amount of any such additional loss, damage, cost and expense to be determined by the Court upon an additional hearing or hearings to be held as provided for in said October 5, 1973 judgment; and it is further

ORDERED, that this judgment be and the same hereby is entered *nunc pro tunc* as of July 12, 1974.

/s/ Charles E. Stewart Jr.
U.S.D.J.

A TRUE COPY

RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT,
Clerk

Judgment Entered May 27, 1976
Raymond F. Burghardt,
Clerk

**MEMORANDUM DECISION BY JUDGE
CHARLES E. STEWART, FILED
AUGUST 22, 1975**

STEWART, DISTRICT JUDGE:

Plaintiff International Controls Corporation ("ICC") has moved for an order permitting it to satisfy some of its outstanding default judgments against Robert L. Vesco through certain assets of Vesco and Vesco & Co., Inc. ("Vesco & Co."). The assets are 846,380 shares of ICC stock held of record by Vesco & Co. and 122,463 shares held of record by Vesco. The major issue here is whether ICC is entitled to enforce those judgments against Vesco by proceeding against Vesco & Co.

Plaintiff argues that such action is proper because Vesco & Co. is the alter ego of Vesco and therefore should not enjoy corporate status immune from Vesco's personal liabilities. In addition, ICC argues that Vesco & Co. obtained the shares through transfers from Vesco which were fraudulent as against ICC and therefore voidable. On June 30, 1975, a hearing was held on these issues. We find that the corporate veil of Vesco & Co. should be pierced since it is the mere alter ego of Vesco and to sustain it would work an injustice and fraud upon plaintiff. In view of this finding, we need not reach the question posed by plaintiff of whether the assets were obtained through fraudulent transfers under the New York Debtor and Creditor Law.

There is a strong presumption of validity surrounding the corporate form which can only be overcome in unusual circumstances. *Quinn v. Butz*, 510 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1975); *Zubik v. Zubik*, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967); *Chengelis v. Cenco Instruments Corp.*, 386 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Generally, it is necessary to show that there

is fraud, misrepresentation or illegality involved in use of the corporate device before a court will disregard its limited liability. See *Anderson v. Abbott*, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944); *Lehigh Valley Industries Inc. v. Biren*, * * * 30 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a corporation can be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.

Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 757-758 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In the instant case we have a number of factors concerning the establishment, ownership and operation of Vesco & Co. which, when taken together, lead us to conclude that Vesco & Co. is merely the alter ego of Vesco and that an injustice would result by maintaining the corporate fiction.

Vesco & Co., chartered as a Delaware corporation on July 12, 1972, was organized as a personal holding company for Vesco's shares of plaintiff ICC. Vesco was the president and a director of ICC at that time. The other officers and directors included Shirley Bailey, Vesco's personal secretary and Richard E. Clay, a close personal friend. At some time later, Vesco's wife took Vesco's place as president and a director of Vesco & Co. Around the time of incorporation, Vesco received 52 shares of Class A voting common stock and 1,838 shares of preferred stock in exchange for 350,000 shares of ICC. At the same time, Vesco exchanged 20,292 shares of ICC which he then held as custodian for his four children for 42 shares of Class A voting common stock and 12,000 shares of Class B non-

voting common stock of Vesco & Co., also to be held by Vesco in custody for his children. On December 29, 1972, Vesco transferred an additional 339,912 shares of ICC to Vesco & Co. and received 675 shares of Vesco & Co. preferred stock. Again, Vesco, as custodian for his children, exchanged an added 26,088 shares of ICC for 8,000 shares of Class B non-voting common stock of Vesco & Co. At a later time, Vesco's wife became custodian for all the children's shares. The shares of ICC stock held by Vesco & Co. are its sole substantial asset (Vesco's schedule 13D, Pl. Ex. 1).

In *Quinn v. Butz*, *supra*, the court, analyzing the judicial doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, examined the various circumstances in which it is used "not the least of which are those wherein the corporation is simply the alter ego of its owners." In speaking of a corporate alter ego, the court explained:

we speak not merely of single ownership, or of the deliberate adoption and use of a corporate form in order to secure its legitimate advantages, but of such domination of a corporation as in reality to negate its separate personality. When at some innocent party's expense, the corporation is converted into such an instrumentality, 'the courts will not permit themselves to be blinded or deceived by mere forms or law but, regardless of fictions, will deal with the substance of the transaction involved as if the corporate agency did not exist and as the justice of the case may require.'

Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d at 758 (citations omitted).

While it is true that a corporation can be wholly owned by a single individual without losing corporate status, the "identity of interest" between Vesco and Vesco & Co., already acknowledged by the Court of Appeals, *ICC v.*

Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1350 (2d Cir. 1974), can be sufficient when taken with other factors to find the two to be inseparable for purposes of liability. Vesco owned all of the preferred and 52% of the voting common stock of Vesco & Co. in his own behalf and 100% of the non-voting common stock of Vesco & Co. as custodian for his four children. At some point he transferred his interest in the company as well as the shares he held as custodian for his children to his wife. There is some evidence that the transfer date of July 21, 1972 which appears on the stubs of the certificates was fraudulently back-dated, since plaintiff's exhibit 13 indicts that Vesco himself did not receive some of those very shares until December 29, 1972. Such evidence can only lead us to conclude there was an improper motive in the transfer.

Plaintiff also showed evidence of Vesco's personal use of the corporation, a clear ground for ignoring the corporate form. *Quinn v. Butz*, 510 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1975); *Quarles v. Fuqua Industries, Inc.*, 504 F.2d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974); *Dudley v. Smith*, 504 F.2d 979, 982 (5th Cir. 1974). Indeed among this evidence was a transaction where Vesco & Co. pledged its sole asset, all its shares of ICC stock, as security for a personal loan to Vesco. Although Vesco & Co. argues that Vesco's grant of an option to purchase all of his preferred stock at a substantial discount over market value in return for the guaranty was a good business proposition, we agree with plaintiff that considering the composition of Vesco & Co.'s Board of Directors, defendant's explanation is at least suspect.

The most important evidence bearing upon the relationship between Vesco and Vesco & Co., however, involves the purpose and circumstances surrounding the company's inception. Bad faith in the formation of a corporation justifies piercing the corporate veil. *Maley v. Carroll*, 381 F.2d (5th Cir. 1967); *Chengelis v. Cenco In-*

strument Corp., 386 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Pa. 1975). The stated purpose for corporate ownership of the ICC shares was that it yielded "a more desirable business and administrative arrangement than direct ownership" and was "advantageous from an estate planning and administrative viewpoint" (Vesco's Schedule 13D, Pl. Ex. 1). The estate planning purpose behind the incorporation of Vesco & Co. is challenged by plaintiff. We agree with plaintiff that the circumstances surrounding the incorporation refute defendant's claimed estate planning purpose.

Vesco & Co. called Alan K. Bloom, formerly a member of the accounting firm, Coopers & Lybrand, as a witness at the hearing. He testified that he presented the idea of a personal holding company to Vesco as an estate planning device in 1967. Bloom stated that such a plan is effective when an individual anticipates a great increment in the value of his investment. It is this testimony which forms the basis for plaintiff's argument.

ICC argues that while the advice was valid as an estate planning technique in 1967 when the value of ICC shares was low and Vesco could anticipate a rapid and large increase in that value, it was no longer valid in 1972 when the plan was executed. While the shares did rise in the period after 1967, after the initiation by the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") of its investigation in 1971, the shares fell to their former low value where they remained at the time the plan was executed. Plaintiff argues that since there could no longer be any great expectation that the shares would again increase in value, the personal holding company was no longer valid as an estate planning device. Plaintiff reasons that Vesco, knowing the serious nature of the SEC investigation as detailed in the testimony of Harry L. Sears, an ICC director, was attempting to immunize his assets from his own potential liabilities.

While ordinarily a corporation is formed to limit personal liability, it is an improper use of the corporate device when formed to defraud creditors or even potential creditors. See *ICC v. Vesco*, 490 F.2d 1334, 1350 (2d Cir. 1974); *Plumbers & Fitters, Local 761 v. Matt J. Zuich Construction Co.*, 418 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1969). Cf. New York Debtor & Creditor Law, §276 (McKinney's 1945). The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil "is designed to prevent a person from doing injury and then escaping responsibility by hiding behind a corporate shield." *Plumbers & Fitters, Local 761 v. Matt J. Zuich Construction Co.*, 418 F.2d at 1058. Here, Vesco knew he was under investigation and "actually transferred his ICC common stock to Vesco & Co. at a time when he was actively engaged in his allegedly fraudulent scheme." *ICC v. Vesco*, 490 F.2d at 1350.

In addition to the fact that Vesco knew he was under investigation and made the transfer to Vesco & Co. during the time period covered by the detailed allegations of fraud in the complaint, Vesco made other transfers of property at the time. This apparent scheme to dispose of a wide variety of assets supports the conclusion that Vesco's intent with regard to the formation of Vesco & Co. was improper. These other transfers were stipulated to in substance at the hearing and need not be set forth here.

In light of all the above circumstances, we think that plaintiff ICC has demonstrated that the incorporation of Vesco & Co. was not for a valid corporate purpose, but rather was an attempt by Vesco to immunize his assets from liability while maintaining personal control over and use of those assets. In view of this finding, we find it desirable to appoint a receiver to collect those assets. Defendants Vesco and Vesco & Co. are directed to turn over all certificates of shares of ICC and Fairfield General

Corporation stock in their possession, custody or control, to the receiver within 20 days of such appointment, whether or not those certificates are within the United States. *United States v. Ross*, 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962). However, we modify this order in accordance with *Ross*. Defendant Vesco, a non-resident of the United States, shall first "apply for such official consent to such transfer as may be required" in order "to provide against any possibility that any action ordered . . . will violate foreign law." 302 F.2d at 834.

Plaintiff has additionally requested that this court issue an order permitting ICC to cancel the stock held by Vesco and Vesco & Co. We defer decision on the right of ICC as judgment creditor to seek cancellation of stock held by Vesco and Vesco & Co. as judgment debtor until such time as it may become necessary to decide.

August 22, 1975

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Charles E. Stewart
CHARLES E. STEWART
U.S.D.J.

**NOTICE OF CROSS-MOTION FOR
REACCEPTANCE OF JURISDICTION OF THE
ISSUES PRESENTED BEFORE THE
SECOND CIRCUIT FILED AUGUST 31, 1976**

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon its Notice of Appeal dated July 7, 1976, filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York on July 7, 1976, and upon the annexed affidavit of Susan I. Littman, Esq., sworn to on August 30, 1976, and upon the memorandum of law submitted herewith and oral argument before this Court, the undersigned, attorneys for defendant-appellant, Vesco & Co., Inc., will cross-move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a) on September 14, 1976, at 10:30 A.M. at the Federal Court House, Foley Square, New York, New York, for an Order reaccepting jurisdiction of the issues presented before this Court on earlier appeal (Docket No. 75-7548), upon the ground that this Court should determine the issues raised on the original appeal as affected by subsequent proceedings below.

HANNOCH, WEISMAN,
STERN & BESSER,
Attorneys for
Defendant-Appellant,
Vesco & Co., Inc.

By: /s/ Albert G. Besser
ALBERT G. BESSER
A Member of the Firm

Dated: August 30, 1976

PROOF OF SERVICE

It is hereby certified that a copy of the within Notice of Cross-Motion of Defendant-Appellant, Vesco & Co., Inc., for Reconsideration of Issues Raised in Earlier Appeal, supporting affidavit of Susan I. Littman, and memorandum of law, were personally served upon the following on August 31, 1976:

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Vesco & Co., Inc.

By: /s/ Albert G. Besser

ALBERT G. BESSER

A Member of the Firm

Dated: August 31, 1976

EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES E.
STEWART, DATED MAY 22, 1974

MR. ORLOFF: As I say, I read the Court of Appeals' opinion, in effect affirming your Honor, as saying that on the record then before the Court, we all acknowledge there was no evidentiary hearing. I think an evidentiary hearing will establish that Vesco & Co. is not the alter ego. Maybe that should be held first.

THE COURT: You ask for an adjournment.

What do you want to do during the adjourned period?

MR. ORLOFF: I want to prepare myself more fully to anticipate, combat, analyze and prepare a defense to the evidence that Mr. Carroll is putting in.

THE COURT: I understand that you may need time. Why don't we hear Mr. Carroll's evidence and if you need time, I will give it to you.

MR. ORLOFF: I think I have made enough statements, your Honor, to preserve our position on the record. It is not technical, believe me. I see our position as being one where if we are to defend on damages, we have got to do it now.

THE COURT: I take it your position is that (10) Vesco & Co., Inc. is not only technically separate from Robert L. Vesco, but in fact substantially in substance is different. Is that your point?

MR. ORLOFF: Yes, sir. I think it is a separate entity. I think a full hearing would show it was formed under conditions having nothing to do with what is alleged in this complaint.

THE COURT: I think there may be reasons to believe that you ought to have that full hearing. I would like to proceed this morning and I don't intend to require you to take positions today that you have not thought out and that you are not prepared to take because you have not developed a record.

It seems to me we ought to proceed this morning and certainly I will give you full opportunity to be heard.

I don't mean to suggest—I do mean to suggest, but I don't mean to reach any conclusion that by permitting you to participate at this stage that I have made up my mind in any respect as to the ultimate question of whether or not your client can be subjected to liability.

I would like to indicate, as I have already done, that I think your participation in this hearing may not help your position on that matter.

(11) MR. ORLOFF: Well, I will submit to your Honor now and at the appropriate time whether this becomes an issue that our participation or non-participation should not be legally relevant in any way, shape or form.

THE COURT: I think that is a question we can debate.

MR. ORLOFF: May I respectfully ask your Honor this: I take it your Honor is inclined to agree with the plaintiff's position, as I understand it, that if Vesco & Co. were not to appear here at this point, that there would not be a new damage hearing such we are now holding with respect to Vesco & Co.?

THE COURT: I don't know about that.

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, let me just comment on that.

Mr. Orloff's entire position appears to be premised on the assumption that he has a right or Vesco & Co. has a right to participate in these damage hearings.

We are seeking a judgment here against Robert L. Vesco, not against Vesco & Co.

After we get a judgment, if we do get a judgment, in a liquidated amount, we will attempt to enforce that judgment.

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**EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES E.
STEWART, DATED JULY 12, 1974**

(61) (Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 1 through 111 for identification were received in evidence.)

MR. ORLOFF: Your Honor, I should have an opportunity to put some evidence before the Court also, and I would most respectfully say that I should have the opportunity to put forth evidence, not only as to the dollar figure of any damage award, but also as to the liability issue.

I realize that the plaintiff has taken a contrary position in its memorandum, but, as we suggested to your Honor in our memorandum, both from the standpoint of Vesco & Co.'s potential vulnerability for any judgment against Robert Vesco, and by virtue of the fact that there has been a conspiracy alleged among a number of defendants, who have not had a chance to defend themselves as yet, on this issue, no judgment should be entered until that defense is put in.

THE COURT: I have these thoughts about it:

It seems to me that in terms of the dollars, Mr. Carroll has told us what they are, and my notion is that this is reasonably clear.

On the other hand, what you say about the merits concerns me. I think I am obligated to give you a hearing on the question of conspiracy and on the merits. I'd like (62) to do it promptly. What's your notion on it?

MR. ORLOFF: Within some reasonable time period, your Honor. I don't mean months, but I am talking certainly about several weeks. I would be ready on that.

I would say this to your Honor in terms of the numbers. I don't know what your Honor's inclinations are to whether you have formed an opinion as to the actual dollar amounts—

THE COURT: No, I have not formed a precise opinion. I had in mind that I was going to ask Mr. Carroll to submit an order which would deal with the figures.

Does that seem appropriate to you, Mr. Carroll?

MR. CARROLL: Yes, I am prepared to submit judgment.

THE COURT: I think you would submit the order, of course, to Mr. Orloff, but it does seem to me, Mr. Orloff, that on the figures, the dollars we don't have much to argue about.

On the merits, I think perhaps we do.

MR. ORLOFF: May I be heard on the figures for a moment?

It seem to me, your Honor, a substantial question has been raised in my examination of Mr. Ost, my cross-(63) examination, as to the manner in which receipts from IOS were allocated. And it is my understanding, and I don't mean to sum up at this point—I am sure your Honor will give me a chance to do it in another way—but it does seem to me a substantial question is raised as to whether or not ICC, through the direction of its officer, Mr. Beatty, at least, and this is Mr. Ost's testimony, did not reallocate, or allocate, if you will, in May of '73 that entire amount for the Boeing 707 account which changes the dollars sought here substantially. It changes it by almost a million dollars.

Now, I don't know what Mr. Beatty's testimony would be, but it strikes me that at least we ought to make an

effort to get him in to testify on this subject, because he would have something to say, obviously, as to this.

Obviously, if your Honor will accept the allocation made in that Telex, then I am content, and I don't want to get into that area any further. But I assume Mr. Carroll's position is that the Telex is meaningless, and it was attached to an affidavit filed with this Court, the numbers set forth were in the affidavit, and it was attached as an exhibit presumably to back up the number in the affidavit, and it seems to me either it's given credence or if it's now (64) going to be run away from, so to speak, I should certainly have the opportunity to try to bring in other witnesses to confirm that, in fact, that is the way the amount should be allocated, and we are talking about a million-dollar difference there.

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, on that point, Mr. Ost has been perfectly clear here that the allocation was made initially on ICC's books and records as shown on the exhibits offered in this proceeding, and that the allocation as reflected in this Telex, that was an exhibit to his SEC affidavit, was done merely for the purpose of negotiations, it was not a reflection of ICC's books and records. He further testified the initial allocation was done according to the instructions of Mr. LeBlanc.

THE COURT: As I have indicated, I have a tentative view. I am going to hear Mr. Orloff, whatever you want to tell me, but it does seem to me that we have come pretty close to the end of fruitful discussion about figures.

Now, on the merits, that's something different.

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, on the question of the merits, I don't think I understand exactly what Mr. Orloff is asking for and I don't know that your Honor did.

(65) I believe Mr. Orloff was asking for a full hearing on the question of Mr. Vesco's liability under the complaint, and I think our memorandum of law shows that Mr. Vesco would not be entitled to that, were he here.

THE COURT: No, I don't understand Mr. Orloff to—well, if that's what he means, he is not going to get that kind of a hearing. I understood that what he was interested in was a hearing on the merits of whether or not the charges with respect to the airplane are appropriate.

Isn't that what you have in mind, or what is it that you have in mind?

MR. ORLOFF: Yes. I am not sure I frankly comprehend the distinction your Honor is now making between that and the merits. Maybe I can put it another way by referring back to the complaint in this case.

THE COURT: I am talking about the merits in this matter.

MR. ORLOFF: Yes, the merits of this matter.

THE COURT: Mr. Ost, you don't have to sit on the witness stand any longer. You are excused.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

(Witness excused.)

MR. ORLOFF: The point I am making, your Honor, just to clarify it: There are eleven counts in the complaint (66) in this case. The only count that seeks a liquidated sum with reference to the airplane, and it seeks essentially the same sum that Mr. Ost has testified to, is Count 10.

In Count 10—and damages are sought in that liquidated amount in Count 10—Count 10 seeks relief against IOS,

Kilmore Investments, Global Holdings and Global Financial, for failing and refusing to pay the balance due to ICC, and the amount is quite clearly—have to do with the amounts Mr. Ost has been testifying to.

Now, if those were the defendants against whom Mr. Carroll was seeking judgment, I wouldn't be here defending. As I understand it from his memorandum, what he is trying to show an other counts of the complaint is conspiracy has been charged in which various persons have somehow conspired in such a way that, among others, Robert Vesco—and we say that appears to follow from your Honor's temporary ruling, preliminary ruling, that that might include Vesco & Co.—as a result of that conspiracy, somehow Robert Vesco is personally liable for these charges which are admittedly IOS obligations, and it's in that area that I would want to defend on and put in proof on, because it seems to me it's long jump from (67) taking a book account between ICC and IOS and translating that into a personal obligation of Mr. Vesco—and let me repeat again, my only reason—

THE COURT: Have you got a copy of the complaint there?

MR. ORLOFF: Yes, sir. If your Honor doesn't mind, it's in the Second Circuit Appendix I have.

MR. CARROLL: I have the file copy, your Honor (handing).

THE COURT: Yes. Are you finished?

MR. ORLOFF: Well, I am saying it's a long jump from taking a book account obligation from IOS to ICC and translating that into a personal liability of Robert Vesco for that same amount of money, and that's in essence what they are trying to do here, and they are doing it on the theory of a conspiracy—

THE COURT: Well, what do you visualize, Mr. Orloff, that you would like to do? I don't mean—I don't want you to tell me in detail.

Are you going to put on witnesses? Are you going to have documents? What are you going to do?

MR. ORLOFF: My primary goal would be, but it may not be practical that I can convince your Honor, to convince your Honor that Vesco & Co. is separate and (68) independent, and if you were to enter a judgment against Robert Vesco, it shouldn't affect Vesco & Co., and if you did that, I could stop at that point.

The problem I have had, and I think I said that the first time I came in on that proceeding, is that I have the feeling that your Honor, at least tentatively, is inclined otherwise, and you are inclined to saddle Vescoe & Co. with any judgment entered against Robert Vesco.

THE COURT: You are correct.

MR. ORLOFF: While I disagree with it, I appreciate your Honor is indicating your inclination to rule that way.

THE COURT: I could be wrong about that, and perhaps you should have a chance to show me I am wrong.

MR. ORLOFF: I would like that chance.

Secondly, I think I should have the opportunity to show that, in fact, the whole notion, the whole factual theory that somehow would lead to the conclusion that Robert Vesco is liable for this money personally is simply incorrect, and it's incorrect, quite honestly, largely on the basis of documents that exist as a matter of public record.

THE COURT: Well, it's the second part of that (69) that bothers me. It seems to me I have dealt with that problem.

MR. ORLOFF: I don't know that your Honor has. For example, and I say this only by way of example, one of the underpinnings for their cause of action is that the lease between ICC and Skyways was never approved by the ICC board of directors. Yet Mr. Beatty filed an affidavit with this Court in the SEC case in which he—

THE COURT: I don't think whether it was approved or not approved makes much difference.

MR. CARROLL: It's not an issue here.

MR. ORLOFF: It makes a difference, as I read the complaint, in terms of whether there was some sort of a conspiracy that would cause Mr. Vesco to be personally liable.

THE COURT: I think the fact of that approval doesn't really—it seems to me that's a completely irrelevant problem.

MR. ORLOFF: The plaintiff doesn't seem to think so, your Honor, in its theory.

I mean, I would like to understand this theory. I don't know whether your Honor does. The theory makes Mr. Vesco liable where there were agreements in effect between IOS and ICC regarding reimbursement for this (70) airplane. You have got two corporate entities who enter into agreements and, in fact, as has been testified to, over some period of time, IOS reimbursed ICC.

Now, we have them coming in saying that Mr. Vesco is personally responsible for the balance.

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, the theory is explained very well in your complaint, and a number of different theories.

Number one, the complaint alleges that the entire IOS transaction was a corporate waste perpetrated by Mr. Vesco on ICC and he is responsible for all monies expended in connection with it, that it was part of a fraud in violation of the '34 Act, and all these expenses flowed from that violation. And it's all set forth in our memorandum of law, the various provisions, the various paragraphs of the complaint.

I don't know what Mr. Orloff's concern as to whether Mr. Vesco is liable or not. Mr. Orloff does not represent Mr. Vesco. Mr. Orloff represents Vesco & Co. When the times comes that we attempt to enforce a judgment against Vesco & Co., that's the time for Mr. Orloff to come in for his hearing on the merits whether or not Vesco & Co. is in fact an alter ego of Mr. Vesco; not at this time.

(71) We are asking for a judgment against Mr. Vesco. Then, under the Huss case, liability is established.

THE COURT: That's not an entirely accurate statement, Mr. Carroll. The judgment you are looking for is also against Vesco & Co.

Do you want me to enter a judgment against Vesco & Co., Inc.?

MR. CARROLL: We are not asking for a judgment against Vesco & Co., Inc. All we are asking for is a judgment against Robert Vesco.

MR. ORLOFF: Will I have a full opportunity for a hearing on the merits?

THE COURT: I understand the chances of collecting from Vesco & Co., Inc., are better than collecting from Robert L. Vesco, but that's something you have to decide.

Mr. Orloff, what were you going to say?

MR. ORLOFF: I was going to ask of Mr. Carroll through the Court whether I am therefore assured, and I guess I must respectfully ask the Court, too, that if a judgment were to be entered against Robert L. Vesco alone, would Vesco & Co. have an opportunity at a later date to be heard fully on the merits?

THE COURT: I have just been told by Mr. Carroll he doesn't want a judgment against Vesco & Co., Inc.

**EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES E.
STEWART, DATED JULY 12, 1974**

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THE COURT: I have just been told by Mr. Carroll he doesn't want a judgment against Vesco & Co., Inc.

(72) MR. ORLOFF: I think he is going to come in for one later on, and I want to make sure I will get my full hearing.

THE COURT: Of course you will.

This is interesting. Now I wonder what we need to do, if anything, from here on?

MR. CARROLL: I don't think there is anything to do.

THE COURT: You send me an order, and, of course, Mr. Orloff gets a chance to look at it.

MR. ORLOFF: I thought Mr. Ost was going to send out this statement.

THE COURT: Oh, yes. Let's see, how did we leave that? We have been back and forth on that.

MR. CARROLL: Mr. Ost will send me figures, which I will have Monday or early next week, and I will transmit them to your Honor and Mr. Orloff.

THE COURT: It does seem to me that, although I am requiring this, that it's not going to mean very much.

I will expect to get from your, Mr. Carroll, an order in the course of the next three or four days, which will have been submitted to Mr. Orloff.

MR. ORLOFF: Would you be good enough to send it to me?

***EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES E.
STEWART DATED OCTOBER 2, 1974 IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP. V.
ROBERT VESCO (74 CIV. 1588)**

(8) THE COURT: I would agree with that entirely. If there is no cause of action stated here, then nothing can be done to you.

MR. ORLOFF: As long as we have the opportunity to raise that at the appropriate time.

THE COURT: At the moment, Mr. Orloff, I don't know because I haven't been fully made aware of the pros and cons, whether or not a cause of action is stated. I happen to think a cause of action is stated, but I am open to argument on that.

But, in any event, if I am wrong on that, if no cause of action is stated and I think there is, your client is not going to get into trouble because there are other people in this courthouse who will straighten me out.

MR. ORLOFF: The problem I have at the moment, your Honor—

THE COURT: So that it seems to me the question you are raising is in all respects premature.

MR. ORLOFF: If my client, Vesco & Co., has the right to challenge the existence of the cause of action at some point in time, if that is what your (9) Honor means by premature, then I can see an accept your Honor's point. At the moment there is nobody raising that point. There is nobody pointing out to the court that there is no claim here really of corporate opportunity.

* This transcript is not included in the record on appeal in this case, but the excerpt is submitted by Appellant because it relates to an issue presented in this appeal and involves the same parties and the same Court.

THE COURT: Of course, the question will be presented to you if and when somebody comes after your client to try to get some of your assets, and then you will have full opportunity to litigate everything.

MR. ORLOFF: If that is the position, then I am satisfied.

THE COURT: Of course, that is not to be the case.

MR. ORLOFF: Your Honor, I certainly don't presume to take the court's time, particularly late in the day, to argue things that are academic. I suggest to your Honor the plaintiffs brief was ambiguous as to what position the plaintiff would take. I think your Honor's statement clears up that ambiguity.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Camhy.

MR. CAMHY: Your Honor, the complaint in this action asserts that one Robert Vesco, while a fiduciary of a corporation, appropriated to himself a

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THE COURT: I don't know about that, Mr. Camhy. I would suppose that as a general proposition if a default judgment is entered and pursuant to that judgment proceedings are brought against somebody else, that that somebody else doesn't have the opportunity to raise the claim that no cause of action was stated. I am not sure of that. I would suppose it is possible that there might be a way to raise a claim that no cause of action was stated and that therefore you can't come after me. I don't think we have to worry about that at this point.

It seems to me that the situation we are in today, Mr. Orloff and Mr. Camhy, is this: I am fully aware of the problems which are involved in this matter. I know who Vesco is. I know what Vesco & Co. is.

Of course, you are not going to take the position that you are Vesco, which you aren't.

And, of course, if Mr. Camhy reaches the point where he thinks he can go after Vesco & Co., Inc. to satisfy a judgment against Vesco, you are going to have the fullest opportunity to make whatever presentation you want. The question of whether or not you can argue that there is a cause of action stated here, it seems to me, is one which you can then raise at that point. Mr. Camhy says he doesn't think you can. In any event, I don't think you are entitled to come into this cause of action, this lawsuit, at this point. I am going to deny your motion to intervene in light everything I have said.

All right, thank you, gentlemen.

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